The Artificer-Phenomenological
Primitive and
the Inculcation of
Evolutionary Theory
There is widespread dismay in the scientific community over the lack of acceptance of evolutionary theory by secondary and post-secondary students and by the American populace, in general. The resilience of ÒdesignÓ based paradigms is suggestive of either deeply rooted misconceptions or the existence of a p-prim that runs counter to evolutionary theory. This paper will propose the latter, that is, it will argue that an artificer p-prim is responsible for the failure of wide spread acceptance of evolutionary theory in spite of several generations of inculcation by the public school system. It will argue this on the bases of (1) the persistence of agency, (2) the impulse to ascribe agency linguistically, (3) the transcultural and transhistorical ascription of agency to origin narratives, (4) an explanation for the early childhood development of the artificer p-prim, and (5) the promising pedagogical interventions that employ a p-prim approach.
Science magazine reported that in a survey of 34 countries only Turkey ranked lower than the United States in its acceptance of evolution (cited by Schaller, 2007). Longitudinal studies examining surveys conducted over the past thirty years suggests that the number of Americans that believe in creationism or theistic evolution is actually on the rise (Blackwell, 2003 p59). Eugenia Scott, the executive director of the National Center for Science Education, foresees an exacerbation of this problem as competitive theories such as ÒIntelligent DesignÓ are introduced into the market place of ideas. Scott sees this situation as a call to arm:
ÒAccording to the neutralist principle in biology, a
mutation will eventually replace the wild type unless it is opposed by
natural selection. It is an
unsubtle metaphor: if scientists do not oppose antievolutionism, it will
reach more people with the mistaken idea that evolution is scientifically
weak, and further, that scientists are clinging to it only because of a
previous commitment to atheism—and perhaps a selfish desire to keep the
grant money flowing. The
subsequent further reduction in scientific literacy (to say nothing of a
decline in confidence in the scientific community) is not something we should
passively let happen.Ó (Scott, 2000) |
This evidence speaks to the resilience of these ÒmutationalÓ design-based paradigms. Education researchers have observed that the resilience of ideas lie, in part, in the preconceptions that students bring with them into the classroom. As David Hammer observed:
ÒIt has become widely accepted as a truth, among those
who follow or participate in science education research, that students come
to science courses with conceptions about the world that differ from
scientistsÉ.Ó (Hammer, 1996 p97) |
In studying college physics students, Andrea diSessa, observed that they possessed persistent ÒpreconceptionsÓ which he identified as p-prims (phenomenological primitives) of such high priority as requiring Òdrastic reduction of priority or rearrangement of priority structure to allow expert-like understanding.Ó (diSessa, 1981 p30). The advantage that designed-based paradigms seemingly have over the Òwild typeÓ evolutionary paradigm is consistent with the high priority p-prim; the artificer p-prim, which I am proposing is instrumental in maintaining the resilience of design-based paradigms.
Rob Moore explored college studentsÕ linguistic usage when describing evolutionary processes. His research demonstrated that students have a natural inclination to ascribe agency to evolutionary processes which, as articulated by Gould and Ayala, should be understood as being driven solely by chance and necessity (Ayala, 2007). The author continues by speculating on the origin of this tendency to employ the language of agency:
The question of why the impulse to ascribe agency is
such a compelling one prompts the realization that perhaps the problem is
somewhat deeper than simply one of the ÔregisterÕ of language. (Moore, 2002p
69) |
Moore attributes this Òimpulse to ascribe agencyÓ to the fact that Òevolutionary theory (with all its assertions of chance and arbitrariness) is a relatively fragile construct that has to co-exist with bigger social narratives that work to shape our sense of the world and who we are in it.Ó (Moore, 2002 p69). However, if this Òimpulse to ascribe agencyÓ was due solely to these Òbigger social narrativesÓ one might conclude that scientists who have rejected those narratives and who have adopted the evolutionary worldview would avoid this linguistic tendency. Yet, this is not the case as some of evolutions more ardent and eloquent apologists sometimes yield to the same impulse. Consider the prose written by the famous evolutionary biologist, E.O. Wilson:
DonÕt mess with Mother Nature. The lady is our mother all right, and
a might dispensational force as well. É Ancient and vulnerable, she will not
tolerate the undisciplined appetite of her gargantuan infant [humanity] much
longerÉ. The issue, like all
great decisions, is moral. Science and technology are what we can do;
morality is what we agree we should or should not doÉ. A conservative ethic
is that which aims to pass on to future generations the best part of the
nonhuman world. To know this
world is to gain a proprietary attachment to it. To know it well is to love and take responsibility for
it. (Wilson 2002) |
This tendency to employ the linguistics of agency even by those who reject the social narratives of agency is strongly suggestive of the artificer p-prim. This is not to diminish the role of the social narrative. Indeed, Will Blackwell, in his study The Problem of Student Acceptance of Evolution, is undoubted correct when he attributes studentsÕ Òstrong preconceptions, often based on specific religious teachingsÓ as an impediment to acceptance of evolutionary theory (Blackwell, 2003 p58). But it is likely that these narratives are building upon and thus reinforcing the artificer p-prim rather than being the source of studentsÕ preconceptions (or misconceptions depending upon oneÕs perspective).
Eugenia
Scott agrees with Moore and Blackwell that there exists a strong design
social/religious narrative in our culture which likely accounts for the lack of
acceptance of evolutionary theory in America. She also attributes this resistance to a uniquely Òfrontier orientationÓ which has
decentralized our nationÕs educational system making the inculcation of
evolutionary theory more difficult (Scott, 2000). Again, it can be argued that the artificer p-prim is prior to either the social/religious narratives or
the organization of our educational system. If this were not true than one would expect to find cultures
both past and present which would not ascribe agency in their origin
narratives. This however, is not
the case. A cross-cultural study
of creation myths demonstrates the transhistorical nature of agency in the origin of the earth, life, and especially,
humanity. In each case, this
agency is not an arbitrary force but an artificer that creates purposefully. The idea that the world
and life came about by chance naturalistic forces is a rare cultural
phenomenon. Democritus developed
his concept of the atom as part of a grander philosophical materialism which
was later adopted and elaborated upon by Epicurus and Lucretus. It was not warmly received by either
Greek or Roman cultures. It wasnÕt
until Darwin, as Richard Dawkins points out in The Selfish Gene, that such a notion began to be thought of as
Òintellectually satisfying.Ó
Nevertheless, its lack of acceptance, even among the scientific
community where approximately 40% believe that some sort of divine agency is involved
in evolution (as sited by Scott, 2000), demonstrates the counter-intuitiveness
of the Òdesign without a designerÓ tenant of orthodox evolutionary theory
lending further support for the existence of the artificer p-prim.
The idea of an artificer p-prim is supported not only by the transhistorical nature of agency in creation myths, the linguistics of agency, and the resilience and intuitiveness of this notion, but also by the relative simplicity by which we can explain how this p-prim might have developed. ItÕs very name, phenomenological primitive, implies that it forms early in the intellectual development of the individual. A young child is surrounded by agency acting purposefully to create change—preparing a meal, making a tree house, or sowing a button on a shirt. It is, however, difficult to imagine a child being exposed to a chance event that produced much of anything beneficial. In this context, one can readily imagine how this Òsmall and generalÓ (see Hammer, 1996 p120) primitive notion could later be incorporated and elaborated upon by societal and religious enculturation.
It is possible that part of the failure of successful inculcation of evolutionary theory is due, in part, to the tendency for scientists and educators to ascribe studentsÕ preconceptions as a result of misconceptions rather than a phenomenological primitive. Hammer clearly articulates the different pedagogical approaches employed for dealing with misconceptions versus p-prims:
The two perspectives differ, however, with respect to
what the instructor may find in that exploration. From one perspective, a teacher sees conceptions
inherently inconsistent with expert knowledge; from the other, a teacher sees
p-prims, knowledge elements that could contribute to expert understanding. The principal practical significance
for a teacher is that the former implies the task of dismantling and
replacing prior knowledge, where as the latter suggests the task of modifying
the organization and use of prior knowledge. (Hammer 1996, p117) |
Blackwell describes the impediment to inculcating evolutionary theory as a misconception and not a p-prim, nevertheless, he suggests employing a decidedly p-prim-matic approach to pedagogical intervention, that is, to use the p-prim rather than challenge and deconstruct it:
ÒIf we can thus, somehow, intercalate ideas of
evolution naturally into the studentÕs own belief system, we will stand a
better chance of gaining student appreciation, and eventual acceptance, of
evolutionary theory. To be effective,
this should be done simply, clearly, and without perceived threat to belief
(to prevent immediate dismissal by the student). (Blackwell, 2003, p61) |
He cited D. MatthewsÕ (2001) advocation of the use of Òcreation stories in teaching evolutionÓ as a possible pedagogical approach. This is consistent with the idea that a p-prim is not viewed as interfering with ÒstudentsÕ development of expertise; they are essential to it.Ó (Hammer, 1996 p120). Blackwell developed this concept further by constructing a questionnaire that would be given to students prior to instruction in their biology class. Although not articulated as such, this questionnaire was designed to re-direct the artificer p-prim so that the artificer would be perceived as natural selection. However, this modern day Odysseus did not use a horse made of wood to penetrate the Trojan gates, instead he used puppies:
ÒMost students have experience with and fondness for
dogs and breeds of dogs. For
this reason, because discussion of evolution of dogs and dog breeds is
available in popular books, articles, we developed a questionnaire based
mainly on differences among dogs.Ó (Blackwell, 2003 p61) |
Blackwell reported improved student acceptance of evolutionary theory as a result of his questionnaire intervention. If Blackwell had been dealing with a misconception it is unlikely that his methodology would have made a significant difference in the studentsÕ acceptance of evolution thus lending further evidence for the existence of an artificer p-prim.
Substantial
evidence for the existence of an artificer p-prim has been cited here. The somewhat Orwellian approaches employed by
Matthews and Blackwell where the teacher surreptitiously manipulates this
p-prim to inculcate evolutionary theory has had promising results albeit at the
expense of intellectual honesty.
There is, however, alternative explanation for the resilience of
designed-based paradigms: the artificer p-prim may not be an evolutionary vestige to be manipulated
and then excised, rather it may be an a priori intuition that impels us to the recognition that Òfrom
the greatness and the beauty of created things their original author, by
analogy may be seenÉ.Ó*
Ayala, F. (2007) DarwinÕs greatest discovery: Design without
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the
National Academy of Sciences. Vol 1 Suppl 1
Blackwell, W. (2003)
The Problem of student acceptance of evolution. Journal of
Biological
Education. Vol 37 p58-67
diSessa, A. (1983) Phenomenology and the Evolution of
Intuition. Mental Models. Ed.
Gentner
& Stevens. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Hillsdale N.J.
Hammer, D. (1996)
Misconceptions or P-Prims:
How May Alternative Perspectives
Of
Cognitive Structure Influence Instructional Perceptions and Intentions.
The
Journal of the Learning Sciences 5(2)
p97-127
Moore, R. (2002)
UndergraduatesÕ understanding of evolution: ascriptions of agency as
a problem for student learning. Journal of Biological
Education Vol 36 p 65-71
Schaller, C. (2007) The Journal Vol 34, Issue 8
Scott, E. (2000). Not (Just) in Kansas Anymore. Science. Vol. 288, Issue 5467
Wilson, E. (2002) What is
nature worth? ThereÕs a powerful
economic argument for
preserving
our living natural environment.
San Francisco Chronicle (May
5)