What is science?  How does it work?  Why do we have so much confidence in its ability to describe the Cosmos and to improve the quality of our lives?  These are questions related to the Nature of Science; a topic which has received increased interest and examination in science education over the past decade.  McComas (1998) examined this issue comprehensively and reported on 15 myths regarding science that are held, not only by the general public, but by science teachers and practicing scientists.  There is little doubt that some of the myths outlined by McComas are the result of poor or erroneous science instruction, but others are the result of a conscious inculcation which has promoted science from an adjunct of epistemology to an institution necessary and sufficient for the growth of knowledge and progress.  These latter myths have been dogmatized into our creedal conceptions of science: (1) that science is identifiable with method, (2) that method is the criteria of truth, (3) that good science can only be practiced when it functions autonomously, that is, independent of other epistemologies and authoritative social institutions, (4) that science is right, (5) that science is the best and consequently the only way that Nature should be discussed within the Public Square, and (6) that the methodological assumption of material causes necessitates ontological materialism.

            The myths of science influence and in some instances determine what science is learned and how it is taught.  My Action Research Project, Teaching Science in the Context of Classical Aesthetics, suggests that beauty is a criterion of truth not only in the arts, but in the sciences in that the subject of its inquiry, Nature, is beautiful.  The Classical understanding of beauty is that it is characterized by unity, harmony, symmetry, wholeness, and radiance.  This final attribute, radiance, is a metaphysical reality that can be perceived only through an epistemology which is open to the noetic and tacit dimensions of knowing.  But, the current regime of scientific reductionism promoted and sustained by the mythology of science precludes discussion let alone inclusion of these ideas in what has become scientific orthodoxy—that science is method and that this method is necessarily materialistic.  Yet, there is increasing recognition among scientists that beauty is a criterion of truth in science.  But as of now, to even speak such things is to be uttering a blasphemy against Science and her method.  The noesis of Plato, the tacit dimension of Michael Polanyi, and the beauty of Richard Feynman no longer have a seat at the table of Science.  The result is a science, powerful in her utilitarianism, but stripped of the ability to inspire awe, reverence, and an ethic of intellectual humility essential for the “confrontation with an immense invisible face whose breath moves [us] to tears.”*   How did this mythology of science develop?  How has it dogmatized its methodology so thoroughly as to be granted sanction by the State and accorded legal protection from “heterodox intrusion?”

            It is my contention that this mythology of science has, in part, been articulated and perpetuated through the hagiographic recital of trial of Galileo by the Roman Inquisition, and (2) the “Scopes Monkey Trial” with its subsequent dramatization in the play, Inherit the Wind.  This mythology has now been codified into law as a result of the 2005 court case Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District.  Furthermore, these redacted scientialogumena* are employed to insulate scientism and its corollary doctrine of materialism from criticism by those who embrace alternative epistemologies and ontologies.  It is proposed that through revisiting these trials we can dispel the myths of science which, in turn, may promote tolerance for individual scientists, science educators, and consumers of science who approach science in a manner that is heterodox to the accepted paradigm.

            There can be little doubt that Carl Sagan’s Cosmos was seminal in its influence on the Baby Boommer generations’ perception of science.  Essential to the construction of this perception was an obligatory recital of the trial of Galileo by the Inquisition regarding Copernicus’ heliocentric system which Galileo had adopted, and endorsed through teaching and writing.  It is likely that the viewer of this segment brought with him or her some knowledge of the Inquisition, its religious zeal and brutality, and undoubtedly an appropriate sympathy for Galileo’s ordeal.  What are some of the conclusions regarding the nature of science that the viewer might draw from this episode?  First, that Galileo was right and the Inquisition was wrong.  Secondly, that science through its method will give us a true and objective and hence superior understanding of the physical universe in contrast to other ways of knowing, particularly religious.  And thirdly, that science works best when it is left alone, that is, that science should function independent of other epistemologies and authoritative institutions. 

            An examination of the trial of Galileo will demonstrate discontinuity between the above conclusions and the facts of the case.  It would seem, at first blush, that the first conclusion, that Galileo was correct while the Inquisition was wrong would be incontrovertible.  Although ultimately the Copernican model was vindicated Galileo’s evidence for the heliocentric model was inconclusive.  In fact, it would be another two hundred years before conclusive proof for a sun-centered solar system was demonstrated through the phenomenon of stellar parallax.  Thus, Galileo was right, but for the wrong reasons or rather, insufficient reasons.  The Inquisitioners recognized the insufficiency of Galileo’s proofs.  As a consequence, they requested that Galileo teach the heliocentric model not as the truth, but ex suppositione,that is, as a hypothesis.  In a letter to Galileo’s friend and patron, Fr. Paolo Antonio Foscarini, Robert Bellarmine, the head Inquistor, wrote in 1615:

            Bellarmine’s letter is informative on several counts in that it demonstrates: (1) an openness to the heliocentric model should additional evidence be presented, (2) the recognition of the distinction between a model and reality (often misunderstood even to this day by students of science), (3) an understanding that the criteria of truth cannot be circumscribed by method alone, but requires the confirmation of an authoritative community, and (4) an appreciation for the social and moral consequence of knowledge.  Galileo did not demonstrate either prudence in regard to his scientific claims or the intellectual humility of Bellarmine.   Indeed, Bellarmine’s approach follows the modern scientific paradigm more closely than Galileo as the philosopher of science, Paul Feyerabend, explains:

            The Church had a long history of having to make decisions regarding new ideas that made truth claims.  Controversial theologies were addressed methodically as they were tested against the touchstone of Scripture and Tradition.  Ultimately, it was not “blind faith” that determined the orthodoxy of a particular theological claim, rather it was the Ecumenical Council and the fidelium sensus* that had the final say in the matter. It is not a coincidence that both the Church and Science employ authoritative communities in adjudicating between opposing truth claims.  Science received its paradigm for the Authoritative Scientific Community from the Church.

            The early to mid 19th Century had yet to see the development of a professional class of scientists rather it was practiced primarily as a hobby of the European gentry.  It was not until “after about 1870, [that] there was a scientific culture, rather than science in culture.” (Yeo, 1993 p32)  This culture was developed in large part by the prolific efforts of Cambridge polymath, William Whewell.  Whewell was a scientist, philosopher and president of Trinity College, Cambridge.  He is credited with several innovations that are viewed as helping to establish science as a professional vocation.  Whewell is frequently referred to as the first philosopher of science; he saw himself as a metascientists, one who critiqued science, articulated its epistemology, and proposed how science should interface with the broader culture.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the multiplicity of Whewell’s contributions to science.  Instead, we will focus on his role in the development of an “authoritative scientific community.”  He saw this step as essential for the progress of science on two accounts: (1) to provide a theoretical basis for the many technological innovations that were being produced during the industrial revolution, and in so doing, provide much needed support for this new profession of paid “scientists” (a term which he himself coined) as the public perceived the inextricable link between technological progress and science, and (2) to negate the criticism that were being leveled against Baconian induction that was the basis of scientific inquiry.  This latter point requires further elaboration.

            The philosopher, David Hume, had delivered a devastating blow to empirical induction stating that there was no basis for claiming causality between what he viewed to be two independent events.  The result was a reintroduction of philosophical skepticism which Whewell recognized had to be addressed in order for science to gain legitimacy at the university.  Part of Whewell’s solution was his “concilience of induction” which he explained as follows:

Consilience (another term coined by Whewell) was not a new concept to Whewell.  As an Anglican priest and natural theologian he recognized that this was a criteria of truth employed by the Church when testing the validity of doctrines, that is, the idea of the harmony or synergia of truth.  In the Church, this synergia of truth, was recognized and agreed upon by its authoritative community—the college of bishops within the ecumenical community.  Whewell envisioned a similar authoritative community of scientists—a college of metascientists within the university community.  And it is this consilience of induction with its resultant theories and paradigms, and approved by the community of scientists, which would vindicate induction against the criticisms of skeptical empiricism.  Such a community began to develop in the late 19th century, but was completely absent in Galileo’s time.  Indeed, the only authoritative community that could adjudicate on matters of knowledge in the West, both physical and metaphysical, was the Catholic Church and history shows that it was not timid in carrying out its prerogatives. 

            Thus, in spite of the fact that Galileo’s data was insufficient to prove Copernicus’ heliocentric model, in spite of the fact that the Inquisition requested that Galileo teach heliocentrism as a hypothetical model rather than truth, in spite of the fact that Galileo made authoritative claims for methodology that method alone cannot make, and in spite of the fact that his “proof” rested on his own personal observations not “validated” by a community of scientists—the myth generated by this scientialogumenon of Galileo continues to flourish.  As Feyerabend observed:

In reality, what the Galileo trial should teach us is (1) that science is not identifiable with method—that it is far more complex and includes structures of authoritative communities, (2) that method is not the criteria of truth—rather truth is approached through a complex synergia or consilience between the results of method and the authoritative community and the theories (paradigms) that it holds as orthodox, (3) that good science can be practiced when it functions interdependently with other epistemologies and authoritative social institutions—as evidence by Bellarmine’s concern regarding the social and moral consequence of knowledge which is still highly relevant to this day, and (4) that science is sometimes not right (this includes hypotheses that are right for the wrong or insufficient reason)—that it is not sufficient that its hypotheses be correct but that there must also be a coherence between hypotheses and the methods that generated them, and consilience between the hypotheses and larger schemas of knowledge which can only be recognized and validated by the authoritative community.  Feyerabend summarizes his critique of the Galileo-Inquisition affair as follows:

All of the aforementioned arguments do not negate nor mitigate the fact that the coercive tactics employed by the Inquisition against Galileo was contrary to the search for truth no matter how well intentioned the Church may have been.   Neither does this justify the mythology that science has created about herself through the scientialogumenon of the Galileo Inquisition.

 
            The fifth myth, that science is the best and only way that Nature should be discussed within the Public square, would have been considered both reductionistic and scandalous to the scientists of Galileo’s day.  Indeed, it would have been impossible to find a scientist during Galileo’s time, and centuries there after, who did not assume that there were metaphysical realities underlying the physical cosmos.  Whewell, in his essays on the Nature of Science, explicitly incorporated theological/metaphysical considerations in his articulation of scientific epistemology.   The epistemological assumption of scientists during the first three and half centuries after the Galileo-Inquisition affair was that science was a powerful tool for describing and understanding Nature, but it was not the only tool.  Nature held truths that could not be penetrated by the methods of science.  This would change with the publication of On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection in 1859.  To paraphrase the evolutionist, Richard Dawkins, “Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually satisfied materialist.*”  A simple syllogism follows:  If the ontological reality of Nature is that it consist only of matter, than science is the necessary and sufficient epistemological protocol for the studying of Nature.  Nature become identical to Science.  This is no longer questioned.  In the public discussion of and inquiry into literature, the arts, economics, and history there are a multiplicity of critical approaches.  In the public discussion and inquiry into Nature there is only one sanctioned approach—science.  This was established through the scientialogumenon of the “Scopes Monkey Trial” or more precisely in its incarnation as Inherit the Wind.

            It is beyond the scope of this paper to critique either the trial or the play upon which it is loosely based.   Rather, the play provides us with the lessons we are supposed to learn from the trial.  The excerpt from the 1960 movie version of the play provided here has only the minutest resemblance to the court transcripts yet demonstrates succinctly the “moral of the story” provided by the scientialogumenon:  Religion, as represented by Matthew Brady (William Jennings Bryan) is closed-minded, ignorant, bigoted, and dangerous whereas science, as represented by Henry Drummond (Clarence Darrow), is enlightened, progressive and right.   The education of the nation’s children regarding the natural world had to be entrusted to science—not the science of Newton, Kepler, Whewell, or even Galileo, but one that had made the epistemological leap of material causation to ontological materialism.  It is ironic that this leap has more to do with faith in an a priori assumption of materialism than a commitment to applying scientific method rigorously.  Richard Lewontin, Harvard biologist and apologist for scientific materialism, admitted as much:

           The playwrites, Jerome Lawrence and Robert E. Lee, had Henry Drummond asking Matthew Brady the following question: “Supposing Mr. Cates had the influence and the lung power to railroad through the state legislatures a law saying that only Darwin could be taught in the schools?”  Clearly, the implication is that it would be no more appropriate to enforce the teaching of Darwinism (scientific materialism) by force of law than it would be for the state to legitimize religiously infused science instruction.  Lawrence and Lee were expressing the lesson that was learned from another logumenon—the trial of Socrates by the Athenian oligarchy—that is, liberal education must be free from authoritative intrusion whether it be from religion or the state.  Nevertheless, Henry Drummond’s hypothetical question turned out to be ironically prescient when in  2005, the U.S. District Judge, John E. Jones III, ruled that the Dover Area School Board could not include the quasi religious-scientific theory of Intelligent Design in the school district’s biology classes.  What started off as a separation of Church and State issue has now become, through the scientialogumenon of Kitzmiller vs. Dover, the codification of scientism and scientific materialism.

            NOVA’s Judgment Day: Intelligent Design on Trial documentary articulates what it believed was at stake in the Kitzmiller vs. Dover trial:  “And hanging in the balance was not just the Dover Biology curriculum.  The future of science education in America, the separation of Church and State and the very nature of scientific inquiry were on trial.”  NOVA was claiming that the nature of science would ultimately be defined and hence protected from heterodoxy by the State through its judicial authority.  And when Judge John E. Jones III ruled that Intelligent Design was not science he implicitly defined what science is: that science limits its inquiry to natural causation, empiricism and falsifiability  (Jones, 2005).  The court had endorsed scientific materialism thus making the a priori commitment to material causes “scientific.”  The extraordinary claim of materialism should require that science provide the extraordinary natural, empirical, and falsifiable evidence for its justification—which, as Lewontin observed, it cannot do.  But what science cannot do the State has done.  A U.S. District court has settled the four hundred year debate between philosophers, scientists, and theologians regarding the nature of science:  science is materialistic and any one who discusses or teaches about Nature in the public square in a way contrary to this opinion will be in contempt of the Court’s ruling.  Scientialogumena have come full circle, from Galileo and Inquisition to Kitzmiller vs. Dover—the mythology of science is now complete. 

            The consequence of this mythology is that students are being taught a reductionist view of science.  Any attempt to incorporate such perspectives as those offered below would likely be held with profound skepticism and might even generate legal action as an inappropriate incursion of religion into the domain of science:

•  “The sense that behind anything that can be experienced there is a something that our mind cannot grasp and whose beauty and sublimity reaches us only indirectly .…”

• “You can recognize truth by its beauty and simplicity.”

• “How sad it would be, I thought, if we humans ultimately were to lose all sense of mystery, all sense of awe, if our left brains were utterly to dominate the right so that logic and reason triumphed over intuition and alienated us absolutely from our innermost being, from our hearts, from our souls.”

• “…blindly seeing, deafly hearing, unconsciously remembering, that drives the larva into the butterfly.  If [the scientist] has not experienced, at least a few times in his life, this cold shudder down his spine, this confrontation with an immense invisible face whose breath moves him to tears, he is not a scientist.”

• “…mystery remains, more profound and more beautiful than ever before, a reality almost inaccessible to our feeble human means.”

Yet to deny access to such thinking would be to negate the epistemologies of some of the greatest scientists of the twentieth century: Albert Einstein, Richard Feynman, Jane Goodall, Erwin Chargaff, and Christian René de Duve, respectively.  I am not proposing epistemological anarchy, rather that we consider the recommendation of Lewis Thomas, biologist and author of Lives of a Cell:

Indeed, we need a science willing to embrace the noetic apprehension of the Beautiful in Nature.  Then, these insights can be taken before a Community of open-minded Scientists that includes both materialists and metaphysicians who can then examine them for coherence and consilience.  Science committed to truth need not fear plurality within its methodology and neither should science instruction.  The True as well as the Good and Beautiful inherent in Nature can best be known when we approach her with intellectual humility and not with rigid and exclusionary epistemologies created and perpetuated through mythology.

References:
Feyerabend, P. (1994) Against Method.  New York. Verso
Guimarães, A. from A. Favaro, Opere di Galileo, vol. 2, p. 155, apud E. Vacandard, entry
Galilée, Dictionaire de Theologie Catholique, vol. 6, col. 1062. Downloaded from web on November 28th, 2007: http://www.traditioninaction.org/History/A_003_Galileo.html

Lewontin, R. (1997) Billions and Billions of Demons The New York Review Vo. 9
January 1997 p.31

Jones, J (2005) Decision of Court.  Judge John E. Jones III presiding.  As published on
the wed and downloaded on December 1, 2007: http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/dover/kitzmiller_v_dover_decision.html

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Downloaded December 1, 2007:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/whewell/

Thomas, L. (1995) Late Night Thoughts on Listening to Mahler’s Ninth Symphony, New
York. Penguin Books

Yeo, R. (1993) Defining Science:  William Whewell, natural knowledge and the public
debate in early Victorian Britain.  Cambridge, England.  Cambridge University Press